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FIDUCIARY ADMINISTRATION-PowER oF CouRT To AumoruZE
INTER Vxvos DISTRIBUTION FROM INCOMPETENT'S ESTATE-The guardians
of an eighty-six-year-old incompetent multi-millionaire petitioned for
authorization to give a portion of the ward's assets to his children and grandchildren. It was not suggested that the proposed beneficiaries were currently
in need of funds,1 but rather the sole purpose of the inter vivas distribution
was to minimize the impact of federal estate taxes on the ward's estate at his
death. It was alleged and proved, however, that the proposed distribution
would follow a plan which accorded substantially with the terms of the
ward's will, and which the ward presumably would have followed himself,
had he remained competent to manage his own affairs.2 On petition to the
Delaware Chancery Court, held, authorization granted. An incompetent's
guardian may be authorized to distribute assets of the estate while the ward
is still alive in order to effect substantial federal estate tax savings, so long
as it is proved that the ward probably would have done the same thing had
he remained competent. In re duPont, 194 A.2d 309 (Del. Ch. 1963).
The substitution of judgment rule provides that a court having jurisdiction of the property of an incompetent may, under certain circumstances,
permit distributions from his estate to persons who otherwise have no lawful
claim for support against the incompetent. This rule was first announced
in Ex parte Whitbread,3 where Lord Eldon authorized payments out of a
ward's surplus income for the benefit of his brothers and sisters, who were
found to be in need.4 The ground of decision was not that the brothers and
sisters had any right to an allowance, but that the court was merely authorizing what the ward himself probably would have done, if competent.5
The principle of the Whitbread case has subsequently been recognized

1 On the contrary, they were presumably provided for quite adequately. Principal
case at 310.
2 Under the terms of the ward's will the remainder of his estate, after certain bequests
to charities, was to be left by testamentary trust for the benefit of his children and grandchildren. After allowing for charitable contributions and expenses the ward's net taxable
estate would be worth about $135,200,000. The guardians therefore proposed that assets
valued at about $36,000,000 be given to the ward's children and grandchildren under an
inter vivos trust which, except for the fact that the distribution would constitute a present
gift, would conform in all substantial aspects to the terms of the ward's will, and which
would enable the $36,000,000 to be taxed at the more advantageous gift tax rates. Principal
case at 310.
8 2 Mer. 99, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (Ch. 1816).
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
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or adopted in a number of American states.6 However, the American authorities which have adopted the rule, like their English counterparts,7 have
authorized such allowances only upon proof of two conditions. It must be
shown that the ward probably would have done likewise, if competent, and
the purpose of the allowance must be to aid relatives who are in need of
funds for their support.8 Few changes have been made in the traditional
Whitbread rule, but in some states it has been extended to allow payments
for support even though the principal of the incompetent's estate will be
invaded.9
In some states the Whitbread rule has been rejected, but not because
of disagreement with the principles which underlie it. Courts rejecting the
rule have stated that the statutes delimiting their powers preclude its adoption.10 Courts which have adopted the rule, however, have not found the
authority to do so expressly granted to them by the legislature.11 By liberally construing the statutes which define their authority, these courts have
found implicit power to distribute the ward's assets to relatives who otherwise have no legal claim for support against the incompetent.12 The court
in the principal case took just such an approach. 13
Although consistent with past authority in most respects, the decision in
6 In re Hudelson's Estate, 18 Cal. 2d 401, 115 P.2d 805 (1941); In re Brice's Guardianship, 233 Iowa 183, 8 N.W.2d 576 (1943); In re Buckley's Estate, 330 Mich. 102, 47 N.W.2d
33 (1951); State ex rel. Kemp v. Arnold, 234 Mo. App. 154, 113 S.W.2d 143 (1938); Potter
v. Berry, 53 N.J. Eq. 151, 32 Atl. 259 (Ct. Err. &: App. 1895); In re Willoughby, 11 Paige
257 (N.Y. Ch. 1844); Hambleton's Appeal, 102 Pa. 50 (1883); In re DeNisson, 197 Wash.
265, 84 P.2d 1024 (1938).
7 In re Mackenzie, 43 L.T.R. (n.s.) 681 (Ch. 1880); In re Frost, L.R. 5 Ch. App. 699
(1870); Ex parte Whitbread, 2 Mer. 99, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (Ch. 1816).
8 In re Rodgers, 96 N.J. Eq. 6, 125 Atl. 318 (Ch. 1924); Matter of Flagler, 248 N.Y.
415, 162 N.E. 471 (1928); Monds v. Dugger, 176 Tenn. 550, 144 S.W.2d 761 (1940); see
cases cited note 6 supra.
9 See In re Brice's Guardianship, 233 Iowa 183, 8 N.W .2d 576 (1943); In re Fleming,
173 Misc. 851, 19 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Sup. Ct. 1940), 54 HAR.v. L. REv. 143 (1940); In re DeNisson,
197 Wash. 265, 84 P.2d 1024 (1938).
10 Kelly v. Scott, 215 Md. 530, 137 A.2d 704 (1958); Binney v. Rhode Island Hosp.
Trust Co., 43 R.I. 222, 110 Atl. 615 (1920); Lewis v. Moody, 149 Tenn. 687, 261 S.W. 673
(1923). Interestingly enough, the Whitbread case was decided at a time when the Lord
Chancellor's authority over the property of an incompetent was governed by Statute, De
Praerogativa Regis, 1326, 17 Edw. 2, c. 10, and in Kelly v. Scott, supra, the Maryland court
construed Statute, De Praerogativa Regis as precluding the application of the Whitbread
rule.'
11 See In re Brice's Guardianship, 233 Iowa 183, 8 N.W.2d 576 (1943); In re Buckley's
Estate, 330 Mich. 102, 47 N.W.2d 33 (1951); State ex rel. Kemp v. Arnold, 234 Mo. App.
154, 113 S.W.2d 143 (1938); Potter v. Berry, 53 N.J. Eq. 151, 32 Atl. 259 (Ct. Err.&: App.
1895); Hambleton's Appeal, 102 Pa. 50 (1883); In re DeNisson, 197 Wash. 265, 84 P.2d
1024 (1938).
12 A Michigan court, when confronted with a statute authorizing the court to permit
payments out of the incompetent's estate for the support of his family, construed the word
"family" to include "blood relatives, or any group constituting a distinct domestic or
social body." In re Buckley's Estate, 330 Mich. 102, 112, 47 N.W.2d 33, 38 (1951); MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(217) (1962); see Mo. ANN. STAT. § 475.125 (1956); State ex rel. Kemp
v. Arnold, 234 Mo. App. 154, 113 S.W.2d 143 (1938).
1a Principal case at 317; see DEL. ConE ANN. tit. 12, § 3705 (Supp. 1962).
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the principal case, by authorizing partial distribution of the ward's estate
to relatives who did not need the funds for their support, represents a
significant extension of the Whitbread rule.14 In a previous case a Pennsylvania court had denied a request for authorization to make distributions
from the estate of an incompetent for the purpose of minimizing federal
estate taxes, 15 but there the court was limited by a statute which specifically
stated that such distributions must be for the "care and maintenance" of
the recipient.16 The court went on to say, however, that in any event tax
avoidance is not a legally sufficient ground for distributing any part of an
incompetent's estate while he is alive.17
In the principal case the court recognized that the need of the recipient
has been a salient factor in other cases which have applied the Whitbread
rule.18 Nevertheless, the court held that need on the part of the recipient
is not a necessary condition where there are other indications of what the
incompetent would have done.19 Consequently, the need of the recipient,
the possibilities of tax avoidance, and the size and condition of the ward's
estate are merely evidentiary matters which are relevant only insofar as
they aid the court in determining what the incompetent probably would
have done.20 Having eliminated the requirement of need, it was relatively
easy for the court to reach the conclusion that the ward would have made
similar gifts had he possessed the capacity to do so.21 However, the significance of the elimination of the requirement oI need is as yet unclear.
In the principal case the inter vivos distribution did produce a substantial
benefit to the estate of the ward in that it assured a saving in federal estate
taxes of at least sixteen million dollars.22 It is therefore not clear whether
a substantial benefit to the estate will be required in lieu of need on the
part of the recipients, or whether benefit to the estate is simply another
factor which the court will look to in determining the incompetent's probable intention.23 I£ a substantial benefit to the estate is not required, it is
conceivable that a situation might arise in which it could be shown that
the ward would have done something which would be detrimental to his
own best interests. Although it is doubtful that any court would extend
14 See note 8 supra and accompanying text. One leading authority, while recognizing
the Whitbread rule, stated that even granting allowances for support should be "narrowed
and discouraged ••• .'' In re Fleming, 173 Misc. 851, 858, 19 N.Y.S.2d 234, 236 (Sup. Ct.
1940).
15 Bullock Estate, IO Pa. D. &: C.2d 682 (Orphans' Ct. 1957).
16 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 3644 (Supp. 1962). On the other hand, the applicable
Delaware statute provides: "A trustee may, in the name of the mentally ill person, do
whatever is necessary for the care, preservation and increase of his estate." DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 12, § 3705 (Supp. 1962).
17 Bullock Estate, IO Pa. D. &: C.2d 682, 685 (Orphans' Ct. 1957).
18 See authorities cited note 8 supra.
10 Principal case at 315.
20 Id. at 316-17.
21 Id, at 312.
22 See id, at 311.
2s See id. at 316-17.
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the operation of the substitution of judgment principle this far, such a result
would be possible if the sole concern of the court is merely to do what the
incompetent probably would have done, if he were capable.24
The court in the principal case could have avoided the uncertainties
created by its decision had it articulated new limits for the Whitbread rule.
It is suggested that the better approach would be to allow inter vivos
distributions out of an incompetent's estate, as in the principal case, only
when it can be satisfactorily shown that (1) the needs of the ward will still
be adequately provided for, (2) the ward would probably have done likewise
if sane, and (3) either (a) the prospective recipients actually need the funds
for their support, or (b) the distribution will constitute a substantial benefit
to the ward's estate. This sort of extension of the traditionally limited
Whitbread rule seems necessary in order to adapt the law to the exigencies
of modern life. Today, prudent tax planning can play a vital role in preserving an individual's estate for future generations; indeed, in some instances it is absolutely essential. Consequently, it seems both desirable and
sensible to permit a guardian to protect his ward's estate in the same
manner that the ward himself would probably protect it, if he were able.
In addition, if need on the part of the prospective recipients cannot be
shown, the alternative requirement, that a benefit to the incompetent's
estate must be demonstrated, would prevent distributions detrimental to
the ward's estate even though the incompetent would probably have made
them if competent.
Robert C. Bonges
24 Unwarranted extensions of the Whitbread rule are particularly likely if the burden
of proof requirements are relaxed. See id. at 316. For a discussion of the amount of proof
required by various courts to establish what the incompetent would have done, if sane,
see generally, Comment, 17 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 175 (1929); 41 HARv. L. R.Ev. 402 (1928).

